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FOREWORD
Accepting General Mark A. Milley’s invitation to
provide critical feedback on the Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) discussion, Brigadier General Huba Wass
de Czege, US Army retired, provides an institutionally
informed critique of United States Army Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1, The
U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028.
Readily agreeing that the nation and the Army
may have significant challenges in deterring either
Russian or Chinese aggression, Wass de Czege’s critique directly challenges the developing concept’s
logic and legibility of the core problem’s frame. As
Wass de Czege sees it, this logic and legibility gap
raises at least a few critical questions and issues that
future updates to the MDO concept need to address,
including the following:
• The need for greater clarity on the overarching
political concerns, as well as on the sources of
Russian and Chinese behavior. What is their
political purpose, and how do we and our allies
counter it?
• The need for greater, clearer, and more detailed
coverage of “deterrence,” and consideration
of “great power” and competitive behavior in
light of the prerequisites of effective deterrence,
which include credible, capable, and politically
willing allies to defend against this deterrence.
Then, the need for corresponding consideration
of who are those treaty-bound allies?
A particularly insightful contribution in Wass de
Czege’s commentary is his coverage of the concept
development of AirLand Battle, and his comparative
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analysis of how today’s MDO concept compares to
the methodology that developed both Active Defense
(1976) and AirLand Battle (1986).
The questions, and potential “lessons gathered,
then-to-now,” provide context and “historical mindedness” that could prove essential to not only the soundness of MDO as a concept, but most importantly, to
MDO as a new operating model with the promise of
addressing the big question challenging US national
security, and the future utility of US force and power:
how has the character of global geopolitical competition changed, how is it still changing, and what are the
consequences?
Important additional questions include:
• Were these concepts effective in deterring Soviet
and Chinese Cold War aggression?
• Were our assumptions about their use of nuclear
weapons valid then? If not, how did their
planned use of nuclear weapons then differ
from Soviet and Chinese perceived overmatch
in anti-access/area denial now?
• Are these assumptions similar and valid now?
• As after the Yom Kippur War of 1973, do our
technological assessments require a conceptual
evolution of our operations? If so, is this evolution necessary to overcome the strategic degradation of our Alliances?
With a focus on the meanings of competition, the
logic of deterrence, and the comparative historical
analysis of MDO concept development with earlier
concepts including the Active Defense and AirLand
Battle, Wass de Czege and his commentary has provided Army senior leadership with a comprehensive
and critical appraisal of progress made, still with work
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(and thinking) to be done in a manner “temporally”
ripe and vital to getting MDO “right”—purposefully,
spatially, and “just in time.”

DR. ISAIAH WILSON III

Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
US Army War College Press

ix

US Army War College

PREFACE
On January 30, 2017, General David G. Perkins,
then Commanding General of United States Army
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), invited
me to comment on an earlier draft of TRADOC
Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain
Operations 2028. On March 12 of the same year, after
I had gathered my thoughts, I replied that the current
modernization initiatives within the US Department
of Defense are too narrowly focused on physical and
technological capability shortfalls. They lacked vision
based on a fuller understanding of technological
potential, timeless applicable logic, and sound theory.
I saw the current state of reforms similar to the first
post-Vietnam reform of 1973–76, called the Active
Defense. This was the solution to the initial framing
of the problem. AirLand Battle emerged in the early
1980s as the solution to a more mature appreciation of
the situation. Like then, a more mature appreciation
of the situation is required today. We need to shift
from a domain-based concept of old tactics with new
technology, to a highly integrated multidimensional
operating approach of new tactics and strategies to
perform the tasks and purposes of the most prudent
plan for the future. It has taken this long to reduce my
thinking to these essentials.
As a scribe contributing to the AirLand Battle
operating concept, I observed, firsthand, the Army
leaderships’ demand for the intellectual rigor required
to both develop a credible deterrent to the Warsaw Pact
offensive threat in central Europe and to effectively
communicate the concept’s logic and requirements to
the Army and, importantly, to our NATO Allies. While
the ideological contest may have changed since the end
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of the Cold War, the Army continues to wrestle with
very similar enduring political challenges. As with
the Cold War, our adversaries continue to advance
their national ambitions by testing the sovereignty of
our treaty-bound allies and others in their near abroad
or spheres of influence. These adversaries apply all
means of their national power in asymmetric ways to
achieve their ends. Whether we call it “competition”
or “hybrid war,” we should clearly and concisely
define “what” the problem is and “why,” develop
a compelling logical solution, and advocate for the
necessary requirements to achieve feasible objectives.
Although we anticipate how technological advances
may continue to change the methods of war, the logic
of warfare is timeless.
History doesn’t repeat itself, but it certainly
rhymes. While some in my generation struggled to
find a counterinsurgency theory of victory for Vietnam,
the Army’s senior leadership maintained focus on
countering the Soviet Union’s aggression against our
allies in central Europe—a vital national interest. Our
support to a light infantry proxy fight in Southeast
Asia detracted from the materiel and readiness
requirements to deter and defeat numerically
superior Warsaw Pact forces. During the very serious
technological competition for the “Space Race,” we
should not have been surprised when Soviet-equipped
and trained Arab forces outperformed Americanequipped Israeli forces in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
Yet, our adversary’s technological advances applied
on that battlefield challenged, if not invalidated,
mostly all our assumptions for the defense of central
Europe. Then, like now, our adversary’s technological
advances required operational solutions to guarantee
strategic ends. It was during the course of developing
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a credible operational concept to overcome this
challenge, that the US Army rediscovered and
incorporated the principles and lexicon of operational
art and campaigning into Army, Allied, and,
eventually, Joint doctrines.
Fortunately, our Army retained and promoted
many critical and creative thinkers as the senior
leaders required to shepherd the necessary changes to
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership
and education, personnel, and facilities to field
the asymmetric requirements for the aspirational
AirLand Battle operating concept. The evolution
and institutional learning in the development of
that concept resulted in both a published doctrine
and in an established norm of identifying the “what,
why, and how” of the development of doctrine that
informs the operations of the Army, Joint Force, and
our Allies. Throughout that development, we scribes
learned that our senior leaders’ thinking and advocacy
demanded a logical explanation. Informed by history,
we had to confront the political and military context
as it was. This required clear, easily understood prose
that communicated just as effectively to an 18-yearold infantryman as it would to an ally’s general staff.
Moreover, both the problem and solution required
sufficient scientific rigor to question, test, and improve
the operational concept and determine the “man,
train, and equip” asymmetric means to deter our
adversaries credibly.
Contributing to the development of the AirLand
Battle operating concept benefited me, both
professionally and personally. Professionally, the
effort challenged me intellectually. Understanding
the problem required us to revisit history and
study politics—ours and our adversaries—and the
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neglected writings of military theorists that only a
select few chose to read. We had to understand the
physics of emerging technologies and its potential
application on the battlefield—both kinetic and
nuclear. We quickly gained an appreciation for the
sheer scale of the logistics necessary to deter, defend,
and, if necessary, secure occupied allied territories.
With our cursory understanding, we then had to
effectively communicate both the problem and a
logical hypothesis that could withstand scientific
rigor and testing. Above all else, I am most thankful
that this professional experience led to my further
contributions in how the Army articulated the “what”
and “why” in its doctrine, fundamentally changed
how we trained, and, most importantly, educated and
trained the officer corps in “how” to think critically
and creatively about the operational art.
Personally, my contributions to the development
of the AirLand Battle operating concept introduced
me to many mentors and peers who would go on
to either serve as senior leaders or make lasting
intellectual contributions to the Army. First, I’d like to
recognize and thank the Army’s senior general officer
cohort of the decade beginning in 1979. They not only
encouraged new ideas but also enforced disciplined
thinking. They were led by Army Chief of Staff General
Edward C. Meyer, and included Generals Donn A.
Starry, William R. Richardson, Robert M. Shoemaker,
Richard E. Cavazos, Edwin H. Burba, John R. Galvin,
Gordon R. Sullivan, and Carl E. Vuono. They were
my teachers. Next, I need to credit two teammates at
Fort Leavenworth, then Lieutenant Colonel Leonard
D. Holder and Colonel Richard H. Sinnreich, whose
intellect, innovation, and common sense contributed
much to our Joint enterprise. Finally, I need to thank
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contemporaries whose time and concentration on
this project helped me shape the arguments of this
commentary: Major General Waldo D. Freeman, US
Army retired; Colonel Paul Tiberi, US Army retired;
Major General George A. Higgins, US Army retired;
Major General Raymond D. Barrett, US Army retired;
Major General William C. Hix, US Army retired;
Colonel Isaiah (Ike) Wilson III, US Army retired; and
Colonel George Shatzer, US Army.
No concept survives “first contact” with a new
strategic problem whole or intact. Every strategic
problem will be unique. Strategic context, the ends
of strategy, the “enemy,” physical conditions, social
contexts, and technologies will change constantly,
and methods are mere points of departure for
adaptation. To be sound and useful, however,
operating concepts cannot be a vague discussion of
hypothetical cases. They must provide solutions for
very real, specific, and salient strategic problems. I
offer the following critique to contribute further to the
Army’s “discussion, analysis, and development” of its
doctrine and operating concepts.

Huba Wass de Czege
Brigadier General
US Army, Retired
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SUMMARY
Any response to Russian or Chinese aggression
from the United States and its Allies requires military
operating concepts, materiel solutions, and forward
deployed forces in well-planned and prepared
defenses to deter these adversaries credibly and, if
necessary, defend the status quo. These concepts must
rely on sound military theories and testable hypotheses
that yield a logical theory of victory. Unfortunately,
the central ideas in United States Army Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1, The
U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 (MDO),
inherits foundational flaws from its preceding concepts (such as the AirLand Battle and the Operational
Context); thus, the pamphlet fails the challenge.
Cold War requirements for deterrence and defense
provide more relevance to these challenges than recent
conventional combat operations. Then, we assessed
the Warsaw Pact armies as capable of a “blitzkrieg”
conventional attack that would overwhelm Allied
defenses and NATO’s nuclear deterrent. The AirLand Battle concept provided NATO with logical and
validated means to win the “first battle” decisively
through the systemic defeat of Warsaw Pact armies.
The concept’s maturity required planners to gain a
holistic understanding of the adversary to develop
a campaign-quality set of ideas with testable lines of
operations and objectives before identifying the methods or means to apply in an asymmetric way. The
development of effective tactical ways and means
for operational concepts requires credible analytical
testing, gaming, and scientific rigor to avoid the risk
of validation on the battlefield. Today’s adversaries’
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behavior and technological capabilities require the
same approach.
A synthesis of the unclassified Summary of the 2018
National Defense Strategy and TRADOC Pamphlet
525-3-1 yields the following concept objective (mission) and principal supporting (task) objectives for
the US Army.
Mission: Contribute to the Joint Force’s principal
task to deter and defeat Russian and Chinese
aggression in both competition and conflict.
Task 1: Contribute to the Joint Force’s defeat of
Russian and Chinese layered standoff tactics in
political, military and economic realms without
risking armed conflict.
Task 2: Defeat Russian and Chinese
technological adaptations and multiple layers
of standoff in all domains (air, land, sea, space,
cyber, and information) that threaten coherence
of operations.
Task 3: Modernize our obsolete way of war,
by adapting to the revolutionizing impact of
the technology of war to succeed against the
militaries of “post-industrial, informationbased states like Russian and China.”
This logic cryptically implies that when we can
defeat Russian and Chinese layered standoff tactics in
the political, military, and economic realms; when our
warfighting techniques have evolved and adapted to

xviii

US Army War College

defeat defenses arrayed in multiple layers of standoff
in all domains (air, land, sea, space, cyber, and information); and when we can successfully compete against,
penetrate, disintegrate, and exploit the aggressive military operations of our adversaries, then our new
American way of war can deter and defeat Russian
and Chinese aggression in both competition and conflict. Unfortunately, this foundational logic is flawed
and the perception about the problem set and mission
and situation is incomplete.
Chapter 2 of the MDO, “The Operational Context,”
does not articulate a well-developed theory of the problem. This chapter should answer questions such as the
following: (1) Given the Army’s mission, what problems arise; (2) What are the cluster of problems within
the situation that help the aggressor achieve objectives without risking armed conflict; (3) What military
weaknesses and disadvantages need to be overcome;
(4) Why are the adversaries not deterred, and what
would deter them; and (5) What are the “problems” in
the defense that facilitate an enemy’s early fait accompli occupation of a US ally? Without such a clear line
of inquiry, readers must infer a complex leap of logic
to grasp the concept’s military problem.
Likewise, MDO’s chapter 3, “Multi-Domain Operations,” fails to articulate a clear solution to the military problem. Instead, the concept offers a flawed
central idea that is insufficient as an understandable
theory of victory supported by testable hypotheses
and scientific inquiry. As such, it will likely fail to
deter potential adversaries’ attacks against allies that
we are treaty-bound to defend. To deter credibly, the
MDO must clearly define the military problem and
articulate a theory of victory that is understandable
and logical to Allies and adversaries alike.
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Compounding these logical challenges, the MDO’s
use of vague language confounds the reader’s understanding of the concept. For example, the frequent use
of ill-defined terms such as standoff and domain confuse
the already thin logic of the concept. The evolution of
MDO must use common English words to provide
clarity as it informs Army, Joint, and Allied doctrine.
A revised MDO concept must clearly articulate its
mission purpose. To “deter and defeat Russian and
Chinese aggression in both competition and conflict”
is vague and lacks a meaningful purpose. We should
clearly explain what Russian and Chinese behavior
is intolerable and why and the consequences such
behavior will likely incur. The key idea requires us to
deter war as the overriding purpose. Aggressors must
believe they cannot credibly succeed. Doubt invites a
test. Therefore, defensive alliances are so important.
Unfortunately, the MDO concept advocates that
we symmetrically counter these adversaries by framing conflict as a contest between their ability to deploy
advanced air defense and area denial defenses and
our ability to overcome them. This normalizes and
legitimizes the coercion and subversion of our allies as
mere competition.
The MDO concept for responding to and winning
conflict is also symmetrically conceived. It assumes
that an adversary’s surprise attack will overwhelm an
unidentified allied forward defense and then immediately array multiple layers of defenses in depth in
all relevant dimensions (air, land, sea, space, cyber,
and information). The pamphlet seemingly overlooks the very demanding task of defending an ally’s
territory under armed attack. Subsequently, the
United States and our allies would conduct a counteroffensive campaign of reconquest in the form of a
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strategic movement to contact, which plays right into
the strong conventional and nuclear defensive posture of our adversaries. We can and must avoid this
asymmetric choice.
The MDO asserts that the biggest military challenge we face against adversaries like Russia and
China is “maintaining the coherence of our operations.” Such thinking limits our choices. We need
more than the technological capability to defeat the
defenses Russia and China can erect over their assault
formations. We need to organize a forward stationed
and rapidly deployable air, land, sea, space, cyber,
and information defense of allied territory. This will
require sustainment at the scale of the military enterprise and the successful practice of mission command
initiative for us and with our allies.
The following argues for a revised theory of victory: deterring Russian and Chinese aggression
against allies that we are treaty-bound to defend.
Having to defeat Russian and Chinese aggression is a
distant second place, even when we are successful in
achieving a stable and advantageous peace afterward.
The real test of sufficiency is proving that the Army
can succeed along all lines of operations and adapt the
warfighting means and methods necessary to enable
that mission. Although some very essential lines of
effort in the concept may not be in the Army’s power
to initiate, they are vitally important to strategic success, and they are within the Army leadership’s power
to advocate.
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COMMENTARY ON “THE US ARMY
IN MULTI-DOMAIN OPERATIONS 2028”
INTRODUCTION
Countering the aggression of Russian or Chinese
“hegemonic” behavior will require a rapid, ready,
and appropriate reaction along anticipated lines
of operations to deter rather than accelerate crisis
escalation, and to defend the status quo when
challenged.1 Such a reaction must rely on sound
military theory built on a latticework of testable (and
tested) hypotheses that yield logical theories of victory.
To clarify, theory of victory is a term I have adopted
and exemplified from Dr. Bradford A. Lee, formerly
of the US Naval War College. Military Strategic Concept
is the best term for a general conceptual scheme for
achieving the purpose of a national or allied military
strategy. In this case, victory should be defined as
keeping the peace.
So, the question is, do the central ideas in the
United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army in MultiDomain Operations, 2028, provide logical counters
to hegemonic behavior from Russia or China? The
principal challenge in the development of operating
concepts requires sufficient scientific rigor so that
purposeful analytical testing and “gaming” identifies
true requirements for tactical ways and means.
Given former Chief of Staff General Mark A. Milley’s
1. Jim Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy
of The United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s
Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense,
2018), 1–3, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents
/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.

1

invitation for critical feedback in TRADOC Pamphlet
525-3-1’s foreword, this commentary aims to strengthen
the “foundation for continued discussion, analysis,
and development” of the Multi-Domain Operations
(MDO) important counteraggression concept.2
The logic of the counteraggression concept in the
current version of MDO can be strengthened in a
number of ways:
1. It must make clear what Russian and Chinese
behavior is intolerable and why, and the likely
consequences for such behavior.
2. It must not adopt the adversaries’ terminology
and logic of aggressive and subversive
“competition” and armed “conflict.” Doing so
invites thinking and engaging our adversaries
symmetrically rather than asymmetrically.
3. This counteraggression concept must include
proven ways to offset the US and Allied
disadvantages of distance and reaction in cases
of Russian and Chinese aggression.
4. The MDO concept must correctly frame the
actual problem that needs a solution.
5. The central idea or solution must reveal more
than the broad rule of thumb (by way of three
tenets) it currently provides.
6. Finally, friend and foe alike must clearly
understand the concept’s logic and theory of
victory convincingly.

2. Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC), The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028,
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Washington, DC: TRADOC, 2018),
i, https://www.tradoc.army.mil/Portals/14/Documents/MDO
/TP525-3-1_30NOV2018.pdf.

2

The return to near-peer competition requires
revising this concept to think outside the framework
of the planners’ own experiences. The last 18 years of
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations
dominated institutional thinking over countering
peer-level aggression. As a scribe of post-Vietnam
leaders who were the motive force for a new way
to think and fight against potential Warsaw Pact
offensive operations designed to preempt a US-NATO
nuclear deterrent that had lost credibility, I shared the
challenges of thinking outside my own experiences
from June 1980 to November 1985 when contributing
to the development of the AirLand Battle concept.3
Our Cold War experience has more to teach us
today than the large-scale conventional combat
operations of Desert Storm, Iraqi Freedom, and
Enduring Freedom. The way of war we practiced
in those wars of choice against minor powers is no
guide on how we should react to wars of aggression
by major nuclear-capable powers then, or in today’s
evolved world situation. Our experience from the
Cold War taught clearly the importance of deterrence
and defense. Subsequent operations were limited war
offensives. A war which culminates from such an
aggressor’s initiative will require the full array of our
military power at once. War with Russia and China
may escalate quickly in ways difficult to control and in
reaction to their initiative, not ours. They may attack
allies that we are treaty-bound to defend; in places
3. Huba Wass de Czege, Lessons from the Past: Making
the Army’s Doctrine “Right Enough” Today, essay no. 06-2
(Arlington, VA Institute of Land Warfare Publication,
September 2006), https://www.ausa.org/publications/lessons
-past-making-army’s-doctrine-“right-enough”-today.
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near and far from us, requiring the support of a large,
capable alliance.
The challenge is convincing these aggressors they
will fail if they try. Today, we need to think about the
logic of the problem and the operational concepts of
a solution within a more complex and multifaceted
global situation.
The current MDO counteraggression concept
shares the shortcoming of its recent predecessors
Rapid Decisive Operations, AirSea Battle, and MultiDomain Battle. Specifically, an operating concept
design should first identify achievable objectives then
the methods to apply. The current MDO concept fails
to do this. Additionally, objectives will not be unitary.
Multiple, mutually supporting, concept objectives
will require a scheme of several simultaneous and
sequential operational tasks, phases, and lines of
operations. Concept designers must describe the set
of problems; the situation (including the Alliance)
and the adversary; and the testable logic for the
ends, ways, and means of each task, phase, and line
of operation. The formulation of tenets regarding
operating methods follows once required actions
are determined. The current MDO concept does not
articulate vital conceptual and detailed development
and jumps directly to these required actions. Such
logical leaps confound the reader’s understanding and
may incur risks. Failing to develop these lines of effort
frustrates the logic of the concept and the Army’s
ability to test and implement it.
Although some very essential lines of effort in the
concept design may not be in the Army’s power to
initiate, because they are vitally important to strategic
success, they are within the Army leadership’s power
to advocate.

4

LEARNING FROM THE POST-VIETNAM
REFORMS
Like the Army of the early 1970s, today’s Army
must react to new and serious dangers:
1. hybrid aggression by Russians, Chinese, and
others in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and
in the South China Sea; and
2. the proliferation of the defensive technologies
we pioneered before the turn of the century to
such adversaries.
Unlike the reformers of the present, we post-Vietnam
reformers faced only one overriding problem: Warsaw
Pact forces forward deployed and postured for a
surprise attack in the central region of Europe. Our
solution came from thinking within the consensus
logic of a broad Allied strategy of deterrence.
The Warsaw Pact forces that threatened aggression
in the central region of Europe were not only
surprisingly well equipped and numerous, but their
military doctrine (readily available to the West)
was also well-conceived and more suitable to an
offense than defense. At the time, we assessed them
capable of quickly activating a deeply echeloned,
“blitzkrieg” style attack designed to overrun our chief
Allies before NATO could agree to release nuclear
weapons in response. To make NATO’s nuclear
deterrence strategy credible to Soviet leaders, NATO’s
conventional defenses needed to be strong enough to
deny Warsaw Pact forces’ territorial objectives long
enough to complete the nuclear release consultations
among Allies. How we achieved this aim was
reframed three times after the 1973 Yom Kippur
War when Soviet-equipped and trained Arab forces
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outperformed American-equipped Israelis (namely,
Active Defense, defense plus power, and defense plus
tactical logic for disruption, delay, and destruction).
At first, the perceived “problem” was that
NATO strategy and the General Defense Plan of its
Central Army Group (CENTAG) in Europe required
the conventional defenses of the several forwardpositioned CENTAG corps to be powerful enough
to lend credibility to NATO’s nuclear deterrent. This
required a shocking “First Battle” defeat at the Allied
frontiers against a Warsaw Pact surprise attack that
could materialize within 48 hours of warning.
The first framed solution to winning this first battle
was the Active Defense concept, published in 1976.
The means of this requisite shocking first battle victory
required improved weapons and optimized platoon,
company, and battalion level tactics of an active
forward-positioned ground forces defense. The Army
focused on fighting the enemy ground forces short
of the mutually agreed to Fire Support Coordination
Line. The NATO Air Forces focused on fighting the
enemy beyond. The logic of Active Defense was not a
convincing solution, and thus failed to win acceptance
both within the Army and among our Allies.
Subsequently, we reframed the problem a second
time. Though the tactical reforms added power to the
defense, they also added offsetting vulnerabilities.
Many critics did not believe that defensive power
was sufficient to win the requisite shocking first
battle victory.4 Ten years later, a third reframed
4. Huba Wass de Czege, Lessons from the Past, 5-8; and Wass
de Czege, “Answering the Army’s Critics: Doctrinal Reforms,”
in The Defense Reform Debate: Issues and Analysis, ed. Asa A Clark
IV, Peter W. Chiarelli, Jeffrey S. McKitrick, and James W. Reed
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984).
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problem brought specificity. To convince the Soviet
leadership that outnumbered NATO forces would
win the opening conventional defensive campaign
on short notice, a new theory of victory required the
systemic defeat of the Warsaw Pact armies and frontlevel offensive formations to seem highly likely, if not
inevitable.
The initial focus of the third revision was to add
the logic for how brigades, divisions, and corps would
fight within the NATO strategy and the CENTAG
General Defense Plan. General Donn A. Starry’s
Extending the Battlefield provides an instructive review
on the development and evolution of this operation
concept design.5 This evolution required the tactics of
corps, divisions, and brigades to
• look deep to allow for early disruption, delay,
and destruction of follow-on or reinforcing
echelons;
• move fast against the unsupported assault echelons; and
• strike quickly to prevent the adversary’s achievement of their objectives.
Most significantly, the US Army and Air Force
partnered to encourage NATO air and ground forces
to integrate their operations more effectively.
However, we came to a critical realization:
the Active Defense doctrine was only a general
philosophy, a method of fighting, or a way of war.
A philosophy or method of fighting is based only on
principles or tenets sanctioned by an accredited source
of institutional wisdom.
5. Donn A. Starry, “Extending the Battlefield,” Military
Review 61, no. 3 (March 1981): 31–50, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc
.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p124201coll1/id/334/rec/8.
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An operating concept must also outline a robust
theory of victory. That theory of ways and means rests
on credible and coherent theories of both the problem
and the solution. The problem is defined by the logic
of the various challenges that must be overcome to
achieve the aim. The conceptual solution offered
through the operating concept must credibly describe
and explain the ways and means to achieve that aim.
An operating concept, like the logic of a campaign
at war, needs to be the product of design based on a
specific mission and context. As stated earlier, the
campaign and operating concept design begin by
first clarifying achievable objectives then determining
the methods to apply. In both cases, objectives
will not be unitary. Multiple, mutually supporting
concept objectives will require a scheme of several
simultaneous and sequential operational tasks, phases,
and lines of operations. Concept designers must
describe the set of problems, the situation (including
the Alliance) and the adversary, and then the testable
logic for the ends, ways, and means of each task,
phase, and line of operation.
From this evolution, the Active Defense doctrine
matured from a tactical method for fighting successive
battalions coming over the hill into the AirLand Battle
operational concept—an integrated Allied forward
defense capable of defeating the system of attacking
formations, at least to the depth of combined and
tank armies. This required a systemic understanding
of the enemy; a deeper battlefield; purposeful
activity along multiple, mutually supporting lines of
operations; operational unification between two chief
fighting components for the defense of the central
European region; and seamless integration of the
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electromagnetic, chemical, biological, and nuclear
dimensions of Allied force operations.
Applying such reasoning to present adversaries
requires first asking and answering two questions.
What is the wisest way to frame the problem of
deterring Russian and Chinese aggression against
cases that matter most? And, what is the wisest way to
solve that problem? Of course, the answer to the first
largely determines the second. In campaign design,
the “problem” is always an interrelated cluster of
problems, requiring a cluster of efforts to solve them.
The campaign design effort also requires formulating
the logic of the several simultaneous and sequential
operational tasks, phases, and lines of operations of
the concept.
MDO LOGIC AND THINKING
A synthesis of the unclassified Summary of the 2018
National Defense Strategy and TRADOC Pamphlet 5253-1 yields the following concept objective (mission) and
principal supporting task objectives for the US Army.6
Mission: Contribute to the Joint Force’s principal
task to deter and defeat Russian and Chinese
aggression in both competition and conflict.
Task Objective 1: Contribute to the Joint Force’s
defeat of the Russian and Chinese layered
standoff tactics in the political, military, and
economic realms to achieve objectives without
risking armed conflict.
6. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, 4–9;
and TRADOC, U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations, i–xii, 24.
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Task Objective 2: Defeat the Russian and
Chinese technological adaptations and multiple
layers of standoff in all domains (air, land, sea,
space, cyber, and information) that threaten the
coherence of our operations.
Task Objective 3: Modernize our obsolete way of
war, by adapting to the revolutionizing impact
of the technology of war, to succeed against
the militaries of “post-industrial, informationbased states like China and Russia.”
This logic cryptically implies that when we can
defeat Russian and Chinese layered standoff tactics in
the political, military, and economic realms; when our
warfighting techniques have evolved and adapted to
defeat defenses arrayed in multiple layers of standoff
in all domains (air, land, sea, space, cyber, and
information); and when we can successfully compete
against, penetrate, disintegrate, and exploit the
aggressive military operations of our adversaries, then
our new American way of war can deter and defeat
Russian and Chinese aggression in both competition
and conflict. Or can it?
This theory of victory needs a more robust logic.
Unfortunately, the current concept shares similar
foundational flaws from its predecessor concepts,
AirSea Battle and Multi-Domain Battle, undermining
the logic of this concept and evolution of Army and
Joint doctrine. What problem elements are embodied
in first, second, and third task objectives when
applied to vital and actual grand strategic missions?
What is the Army’s contribution to defeating Russian
and Chinese layered standoff tactics in the political,
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military, and economic realms? What is the Army’s
contribution to penetrating, disintegrating, and
exploiting the aggressive military layered standoff
operations of our adversaries? Finally, how do we
gauge the size and scope of the modernization task
against the requirements of task objectives one and
two above?
The Five-Part Military Problem
The MDO’s chapter 2, “The Operational Context,”
leaves the analytical chore of extracting a theory of the
problem to the reader.7 This chapter lists overly broad,
potential mission conditions:
• the four challenging interrelated characteristics
of the global operational environment the Army
will encounter;
• the logic of the MDO framework (a graphical
depiction of the interaction of anticipated arrays
of friendly and enemy forces and weapons on
the modern battlefield);
• Russian and Chinese modes of operating in
recent competition and conflict scenarios; and
• recent assessments of Russian and Chinese systemic vulnerabilities.
The reader must make a leap of logic from the
above general frameworks of partially relevant
theoretical premises to a listing of five incomplete
tactical and technical problem-framing questions,
collectively identified as the military problem.8

7. TRADOC, U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations, 6–15.
8. TRADOC, U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations, 16.
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First, how does the Joint Force compete to enable
the defeat of an adversary’s operations to destabilize
the region, deter the escalation of violence, and—
should violence escalate—enable a rapid transition to
armed conflict?
This three-part question asks how to achieve the
three objectives inherent to achieving the first task
objective above. Are these the only objectives the
Army needs to accomplish in support of this strategic
aim? The remaining questions pertain, in the same
way, to the second task objective.
Second, how does the Joint Force penetrate enemy
anti-access/area denial systems throughout the
depth of the support areas to enable strategic and
operational maneuver?
Third, how does the Joint Force disintegrate enemy
anti-access/area denial systems in the deep maneuver
areas to enable operational and tactical maneuver?
Fourth, how does the Joint Force exploit the
resulting freedom of maneuver to achieve operational
and strategic objectives through the defeat of the
enemy in the close and deep maneuver areas?
Lastly, how does the Joint Force recompete to
consolidate gains and produce sustainable outcomes,
set conditions for long-term deterrence, and adapt to
the new security environment?
Again, are these the only subordinate objectives
the Army needs to accomplish to support this
strategic aim?
A more complete description and defense of the
theory of the problem would come from asking and
answering the following questions:
1. Given the Army’s mission, what problems arise?
2. What political, economic, and military weaknesses on our side (our own, the ally’s, or the
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3.
4.

5.
6.

alliance’s) allow Russian and Chinese layered
standoff tactics in politics, economics, and military realms to achieve objectives (territorial
conquest, radical change in alliance, or radical
change in economic policy) that would otherwise require armed conflict?
What military weaknesses and disadvantages
need to be overcome?
Why are the adversaries not deterred, and what
would deter them? What are the problems in
the defense that facilitate an enemy’s early fait
accompli occupation of a US Ally, or, when the
defeat of an Ally happens so quickly and so
effectively that Allies, including US forces, can
do nothing about it?
What are the problems in Allied reinforcement
between the earliest nonambiguous warning and
the commencement of armed aggression?
What are the problems in Allied counteroffensive operations to recover territory lost due
to early fait accompli offensive success by the
aggressor?

The Central Idea
In chapter 3, “Multi-Domain Operations,” we
should expect to find the direct and clear solution
(the logic of ends, ways, and means) to the five-part
military problem. Instead, TRADOC Pamphlet 5253-1 proposes a central idea that will deter and defeat
Russian and Chinese aggression in both competition
and conflict. That central idea is “to penetrate and
disintegrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems
and exploit the resultant freedom of maneuver to
achieve strategic objectives (win) and force a return to
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competition on favorable terms.”9 Success requires the
following:
Applying three interrelated tenets: calibrated force
posture, multi-domain formations, and convergence.
Calibrated force posture is the combination of position and
the ability to maneuver across strategic distances. Multidomain formations possess the capacity, capability, and
endurance necessary to operate across multiple domains
in contested spaces against a near-peer adversary.
Convergence is rapid and continuous integration of
capabilities in all domains, the [electromagnetic spectrum]
EMS, and information environment that optimizes effects
to overmatch the enemy through cross-domain synergy
and multiple forms of attack all enabled by mission
command and disciplined initiative. The three tenets of
the solution are mutually reinforcing and common to all
Multi-Domain Operations, though how they are realized
will vary by echelon and depend upon the specific
operational situation.10

This central idea, as a theory of victory, has a major
flaw—it is supported only by tenets. Even when tenets
suitably describe an aspirational set of capabilities and
practices, they cannot replace what is needed here:
a concept of operations based on a reliable theory
of victory supported by a latticework of testable
hypotheses that can be questioned and improved by
scientific inquiry.
By definition, a tenet is one of the main principles
of a given doctrine. Tenets can highlight important
ideas; they cannot convey the logic of the ends, ways,
and means of the entire body of the operating concept.
The four tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine—initiative,
agility, synchronization, and depth—were chosen
after the AirLand Battle counteraggression concepts
9. TRADOC, U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations, 17.
10. TRADOC, U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations, vii.
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were fully articulated to highlight and communicate
essential ideas. Our Allies and we should not trust a
counteraggression concept based on tenets, nor should
we expect these will convince potential aggressors
they will fail when they attack allies that we are treatybound to defend. Therefore, a counteraggression
concept must be logical, well supported, and clearly
understandable to stakeholders and adversaries alike.
We need a theory of victory that rests on credible and
coherent theories of both the problem and the solution.
TOWARD A MORE ROBUST LOGIC
Before we revise the logic of the current
counteraggression concept in TRADOC Pamphlet
525-3-1, we must consider ways to strengthen it.
First, however, we may formulate the central idea
of our theory of victory, and the logic of the words
we use must be clear to friend and foe alike. Second,
we should clearly state what Russian and Chinese
behavior is intolerable, and the consequences for such
behavior. Third, we must not adopt the terminology
and logic of aggressive and subversive competition
and armed conflict on the aggressors’ terms. Finally,
this counteraggression concept must include proven
ways to offset the disadvantages of distance and
reaction from aggression by Russia and China.
Words Affect the Way We Think
The ideas in this concept would benefit from
more broadly understandable prose to encourage
questioning, testing, and expansion. This creates
consensus across US military services and Allies,
clarifies professional thought and writing, and breaks
down domain walls. To avoid confusion and promote
15

a broad understanding of how we developed AirLand
Battle, we writers learned to work within two essential
rules: we restricted our word choice to common
English dictionary meanings and wrote at a 12th grade
level of literacy. At first, these rules were irksome, but
there was little confusion about what we meant to say.
The articulation of this counteraggression concept,
and any critique of it, is immediately clouded by the
overuse of the words standoff and domain. Standoff is
a word that came into frequent military use during
the late 1970s, referring specifically to the tactic of
engaging an enemy element when your weapons
can reach him and his return fire cannot. That word
usefully expressed fighting techniques in many diverse
cases, including a dug-in anti-tank defense against
an armored assault, attack helicopters versus tanks,
artillery counterfire, air-to-air combat, and air attack
of ground-based air defense. This term also succinctly
expressed the principal advantage of the ambusher
over the victim of the ambush, or the advantage of a
well-developed, defensive position over the attacking
formation maneuvering toward it. But, today, standoff
is used in many contexts to replace words that are
better suited. The text of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
is full of similar words that confound the reader before
they are defined.
The MDO says we need to defeat the Russian
and Chinese layered standoff tactics in the political,
military, and economic realms. But the MDO should
state more clearly what it means to say, which is that
under the guise of competition, the United States and
our Allies must combat an array of Machiavellian
scheming: military threats, predatory politics,
coordinated diplomacy, and economic reward or
penalty. Their information warfare will include classical
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propaganda and masked cyber and social media
interventions into the voting of our own and Allied
elections. Against our most vulnerable Allies, they
will employ coercive economic policies and direct
subversion with armed proxy forces and contracted
civilian unconventional operators. Our opponents
mean to fracture our alliances, partnerships, and
resolve. They intend to influence our home and Allied
publics. They mean to create ambiguity, slow our
recognition of danger, confuse our policy decisions,
and block or misdirect our reactions. This would be
a clearer statement of the problems we must address.
Just how does the Army contribute to this political,
military, and economic realm of international affairs?
That also needs straight talk and clear thinking.
Likewise, the word domain, as used in MDO, does
not describe the realm or context of air, land, sea,
space, cyber, and information operations. While no
nation’s armed forces have ever fought by domains,
this pamphlet gives the impression that the future
armed forces might. This use concedes to the Air and
Naval services early rhetorical use of the term domain
to make their traditional claim of autonomy from land
operations. Sometimes rhetoric clouds thinking, and
this is an example of that.
A modern Joint Force is organized by components
and their subordinated functional subdivisions. Use
of the word domain suggests analogous reasoning
applies to air, land, sea, space, cyber, and information
operations when the particularities of each are more
consequential.
Offensive maneuver and defensive operations,
once composed of complementary contests in the air,
at sea, and on land, are today composed of integrated
contests in new dimensions as well—in space, media,
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and the so-called cyberspace. Failing to contest any of
these vital dimensions cedes advantages to the enemy.
One of the big ideas of the AirLand Battle concept
was to find and force a separation in time, space, and
function among the attacking enemy forces, at all
levels of command. The MDO seems to suggest that
employing multiple layers of standoff in all domains
sounds like a great and recent discovery. Yet, it is a
normal and commonsense aspect of the military
art at all levels of command, and in every service.
Finding and forcing a separation in time, space, and
function among enemy forces is an age-old practice
of war from the tactics of the Army infantry squad
to the operational art of four-star military Joint and
combined commands. However, due to new ways and
means, how one obtains that result changes situationby-situation, and over time. More important still is
the military art of leveraging so-called standoff at the
tactical level to defeat the functioning of the greater
theater-level offensive system of attacking formations
and their essential support, thereby causing a collapse
of the enemy’s theater-level ability to fight offensively.
By this, I do not mean generic “systems” like long-range
artillery weapons systems but, instead, the “system of
attacking military organizations” understood in terms
of the special function the elemental components each
perform in the attack in progress (not by the book, but
in the specific context).
The next revision of this text would benefit
by replacing these terms, as often as possible,
with common English words that would be more
enlightening and precise. I provide the following to
contribute to the concept’s “foundation for continued
discussion, analysis, and development.”
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The Mission Aim is Too Broad
It is impossible to construct a useful theory of the
mission problem, and its solution, without specifying
the object (even if abstractly) of the intolerable act.
Even though this pamphlet’s counteraggression
concept does not explain this concept clearly, the
Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy states that
the aggression we should be most concerned about
deterring is Russian and Chinese aggression against
our European and East Asian treaty allies. Thus, we
must have convincing conceptual solutions for specific
and worrisome test cases. Russian aggression against
Latvia and Estonia in Eastern Europe and Chinese and
North Korean aggression against South Korea provide
good examples. Therefore, it would be essential, and
difficult enough, to formulate concepts we can use to
meet these treaty obligations, before considering other
unspecified cases.
These cases will differ. Russian aggression (in
mostly a land theater) against our European NATO
Allies, who are mostly contiguous and treaty-bound
to help each other, will require a solution that takes
into account the unique conditions, strengths, and
vulnerabilities of that situation. Chinese aggression
(in mostly a sea theater) against our East Asian
Allies, where our Alliances are bilateral and our
Allies are geographically separated, will require a
different solution strategy. Whereas NATO has a
history of Allied cooperation, codified interoperability
agreements, and combined commands, our Asian
Allies do not, except in the context of a renewal of
the Korean War. In that case, the United Nations
Command Korea still exists, as does South Korean/US
Combined Forces Command. Such specificity cannot
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be ignored. Additionally, how emerging technologies,
space, cyber, information warfare, and more manifest
themselves depends on the specific location and threat.
Additionally, it is necessary to assert that unless
Allies step up to perform the roles they are financially
able, best suited, and treaty-obligated to perform,
our Alliances on paper will not be able to convince
potential aggressors that their armed aggression will
fail, even if America makes heroic efforts to bridge the
gap. For reference, Russia’s gross domestic product
(GDP) is roughly $1.7 trillion. Compare that to the
$11.7 trillion combined GDP of only the four wealthiest
European Allies out of the 27 total countries in NATO:
Germany’s GDP is about $3.9 trillion, France has about
$2.8 trillion in GDP, Britain has about $2.9 trillion in
GDP, and Italy’s GDP is about $2.1 trillion, which
is more than seven times greater than Russia’s.11 A
useful counteraggression concept for this region must
identify and justify the most useful distribution of
functions among Allies. During the early 1980s, the US
Army had to take the lead in critical thinking about
these matters, not just within our services, but within
the services of our Alliances.
Such factors matter because deterring war is the
overriding aim. To deter an aggressor, the opposing
leadership must believe they cannot succeed. Doubt
in the matter invites a test. To defeat a confident
aggressor’s attack, we must cause his attack to fail.
That outcome is a loss to both sides, even when the
defense holds, and it is why defensive alliances are so
important. The aggressor must know that even if he
wins against the defense of one ally, the alliance will
11. “GDP (current US$),” World Bank, accessed December
21, 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP
.CD?view=map.
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restore lost territory by counteroffensive, along with
an advantageous and stable peace. The MDO revision
must conceive of and explain how to do this.
Solve the Problem Asymmetrically
MDO’s principal task of the counteraggression
concept is to deter and defeat Russian and Chinese
aggression in both competition and conflict. It
advocates that we engage our enemies symmetrically
(by their hybrid or gray zone methods) and by framing
the conflict as a contest between their ability to deploy
theater-level, advanced air defense and area denial
defenses, arrayed in multiple layers of standoff in all
relevant dimensions of warfare, and our ability to
overcome them. As currently framed, the problem of
defending our Allies this way leads to symmetrical,
rather than asymmetrical, thinking about the mission.
Once again, words matter. We should not fight fire
with fire.
It is likely we can more easily deter and defeat
Russian and Chinese aggression against our Allies
asymmetrically. First, the interests of the attacker and
defender are, by nature of their purposes, asymmetric.
Second, we optimize our strengths in all the dimensions
of power that our Allies and we can muster. We take
advantage of the weaknesses of potential hybrid
aggressors. We employ military power to set and
maintain the conditions for other instruments of power
to succeed in their proper function. In order to defeat
an adversary by asymmetrical strategies and tactics,
we must understand how the terminology and logic
of competition and conflict works for our adversaries,
and not for us.
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When the politics, economy, and internal (and
possibly external) security of an Allied state is
willfully subverted and undermined by a predatory
power, why would we want to agree to normalize
and legitimize such behavior as mere competition?
Our counters must first legitimate the victim, and
delegitimize the aggressor, whatever his tactics. They
can assist that government’s internal defense against
subversive coercion and externally supported armed
revolt. They can also strengthen its external defense in
every practical and affordable way, such as preventing
the hostile undermining of their external defenses,
assisting frontline Allies in deterring sudden fait
accompli attempts at conventional force invasion, and
other defensive and deterring actions. Calling what
we do either hybrid warfare or competition makes no
sense. Call it what it is, defending an advantageous
peace, one that was hard-earned by past collective
efforts. The essential point here is that while the
current MDO concept focuses mostly if not entirely
on the “tasks” of “fighting,” it should actually begin
with and maintain focus on the ultimate purpose as
Clausewitz and Sun Tzu would put it.
The MDO concept for responding to and winning
conflict is also symmetrically conceived. War is a
very specific kind of conflict in which the aggressor
characterizes armed invasion (a clear act of war) as
justifiable conflict, and the defender characterizes
military preparations and armed reaction as
prudent deterrence and defense of the peace
(preparations for which I would call “responsive
collective counteraggression operations”—reflecting
the nature and superior moral purpose of
such defense).
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The current MDO assumes the aggressor’s surprise
attack, when it comes, will overwhelm an initial Allied
forward defense, which is never identified and likely
does not exist. The aggressor then immediately arrays
multiple layers of defenses in all relevant dimensions
(air, land, sea, space, cyber, and information) from the
aggressor’s homeland to occupied Allied territories.
Upon initiation of hostilities, responding US and Allied
forces deploy from within the theater and beyond,
and commence fighting their way toward the territory
of the conquered ally. Unfortunately, according to the
MDO’s central idea applying the three tenets, success
requires the vital assumption that MDO warfighting
techniques have evolved and adapted to enable the
US and Allied forces to penetrate and disintegrate
adversary defenses, “exploit the aggressive military
operations of our adversaries,” and once again return
to competition.12 This untested assumption depends
on logic examined in the upcoming section, “Task
Objective 2: To Defeat Armed Aggression and Restore
a Favorable Peace.”
Offset Disadvantages of Distance and Reaction
Instead of matching adversary strengths, our
counteraggression concept must adopt new ways to
offset the disadvantages of distance and reaction from
Russian and Chinese aggression.
The first disadvantage we must overcome is
having to react to the aggressor’s initiative. During
the Cold War, we assumed 48 hours of unambiguous
warning of an attack—the commission of the first act
of war. At the time, this was considered sufficient time
to deploy capable defenses. The second disadvantage
12. TRADOC, U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations, 25–46.
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is the potential aggressor’s distance of his aggression.
We can make conventional and nuclear deterrents,
both supporting and credible. For example, a central
question of the post-Vietnam military reforms was how
to make NATO nuclear deterrence strategy credible to
Soviet leaders. The conventional defenses of NATO
needed to be considered strong enough on their own
to keep Warsaw Pact forces out of NATO territories
to complete the nuclear release consultations among
Allies. How to achieve this aim was reframed three
times after the 1973 Yom Kippur War (as discussed
earlier). This question must be answered again for
every potential case that matters.
We can enhance this credibility from an aggressive
forward defense by Allied conventional forces and a
suitable American forward presence as we did in the
early 1980s and still do on the Korean peninsula. This
defense must be sufficiently immune to a fait accompli
territorial seizure while Allies confer on the release
of authority to threaten and respond by nuclear
means. Our European and East Asian treaty Allies
can achieve such immunity when they fully exploit
their natural defensive “home court advantage” with
enhanced defensive technologies, and a well-planned,
fully coordinated, and superbly executed Allied crisis
response. Finally, we can reinforce these measures
with the credible potential to reverse any gains by the
aggressor and then impose an advantageous peace.
This does not require the conquest of Russia or China.
It only requires reconquest of lost territories and
enough advantages over the aggressor to enforce the
terms of a viable and stable peace.
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FROM “WAY OF WAR” TO OPERATING
CONCEPT
Next, we must translate a way of war thinking
into a useful operating concept. First, we need to
rearticulate the concept’s objective. The current MDO
requires the Army to contribute to “the Joint Force’s
principal task . . . to deter and defeat Chinese and
Russian aggression in both competition and conflict.”13
This concept is vague and lacks a meaningful aim or
purpose. A close reading of the unclassified Summary
of the 2018 National Defense Strategy supports the need
for a stronger counteraggression concept with a clear
objective. Thus, a revised counteraggression concept
objective should deter and defeat Russian and Chinese
aggression against allies that we are treaty-bound
to defend. To feasibly accomplish this, we must also
revise the pamphlet’s component task objectives,
which are listed below:
Task Objective 1: keep an advantageous peace in
the face of hostile competitive efforts to disrupt
the accord.
Task Objective 2: defeat armed aggression
against allies that we are treaty-bound to defend
and restore a favorable peace.
Task Objective 3: enable the mission success of
lines of operations identified for the first and
second task objectives.

13. TRADOC, U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations, vi.

25

By analyzing each of these components, we arrive
at a cluster of objectives that, when achieved, produce
feasible solutions. The following analysis enables a
more methodical way to judge requirements than the
rule of thumb metric of the concept’s three tenets.
Task Objective 1: To Keep an Advantageous Peace
The idea of contributing “to the Joint Force’s defeat
of the Russian and Chinese layered standoff tactics
in the political, military, and economic realms to
achieve objectives without risking armed conflict” is
better expressed by the more comprehensive objective
of keeping an advantageous peace in the face of the
following hostile competitive efforts to disrupt it.
What are the Russian and Chinese layered standoff
tactics in the political, military, and economic realms? These
tactics are the day-to-day Machiavellian campaigning
by Russia and China to cause home and Allied publics
to support and enable their predatory purposes, using
all available means and methods short of overt warfare
under the guise of normal competition among states.
What are their predatory purposes? These purposes
intend to influence internal and external politics;
weaken external military defenses; fracture our
mutual defense alliances, partnerships, and mutual
resolve; create ambiguity; slow our recognition of
danger; confuse and slow our policy decisions; and
block or misdirect our reactions.
What are these short of war means? Short of war
means include coordinated diplomacy and economic
reward, penalty, and dependence; threatening
displays of offensive military power and readiness
to use it; and what the Russians call information
warfare. Information warfare is comprised of classical
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propaganda, false narratives, and masked cyber and
social media interventions that make their way into
the voting of our own and Allied elections. Among
our most vulnerable Allies, it means subversion by
internal political parties supporting the adversary, and
outright territorial seizures by armed unconventional
proxy forces, which can sometimes be citizens or
civilian contractors paid by our adversaries.
We can frame our countering tasks and objectives
only when we understand the methods aggressors may
use to succeed in their objectives, such as destabilizing
and weakening target states, separating Allies to
limit their coordination, and weakening the people’s
political will to resist. Among our NATO Allies, and
even in the United States, we have evidence of effective
information warfare tactics employed in the Russian
near abroad, which refers to the group of new countries
that split off from Russia in the wake of the breakup of
the Soviet Union. Maintaining good working relations
and preventing friction among Allies are commonsense objectives. The important operational question,
without an off-the-shelf answer, is “what specific,
concrete objectives can be pursued by causal logic?”
We can frame task objectives when we understand
how the aggressor can confuse, misdirect, and delay
our countering methods and actions. To obtain the
best outcome, information warfare (for example,
social media, false narratives, and cyberattacks) must
be employed by experts and tailored to the specific
situation. Also, we see that advanced, well-governed
industrial states are more likely to be resilient to
subversion than recent Russian targets—Georgia and
Ukraine. We have NATO Allies that we can lead and
rally to maintain a viable UN Alliance in Korea.
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But, even when we have Allies, there are two
more preconflict objectives to pursue. First, we must
strengthen weaknesses at potential points of attack
because current defenses are ill-designed, unready,
and understaffed, and neighboring Allies are too few,
slow, or weak. Second, we must plan and prepare,
during a preconflict crisis and thereafter to protect the
movement of near and far Allied reinforcements into
deterrent and defensive postures. Fluidly identifying
and attending to such preconflict objectives reinforces
the aggressor’s belief that he cannot succeed in the
offense. When the aggressor believes that, we keep an
advantageous peace.
Through the evolution of the AirLand Battle, we
anticipated and understood the dramatic shifts of war
escalation, but never forgot the military’s supporting
role to the highest strategic, political, and economic
aims of Allied governments. Typically, it is the Army’s
task to support the government lead agencies in the
political, strategic communications, and economic
arenas, and to avoid intruding into the sovereign
prerogatives of an ally. Thus, it is the Army’s primary
task to prepare for war in order to keep the peace.
Our adversaries are unpredictable, intelligent,
hardened, and multifaceted. They actively undermine
our strategic interests by overt or covert means, and
they prepare for possible overt aggression. When we
“prepare for war to keep the peace,” we do whatever
we can to cause our foes to react (and be deterred) as
intended. Also, we seek to gain and keep the support
from our people at home, Allies abroad, and even
people among an uncommitted local population. To
summarize:
Task objective one: Keeping an advantageous
peace in the face of hostile, “competitive” efforts
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requires deterring Chinese and Russian aggression
against allies that we are treaty-bound to defend.
This requires
• supporting the US government lead agencies
in the political, strategic communications, and
economic arenas and the sovereign political
prerogatives of an ally;
• assisting frontline, ally-led forces’ efforts to
defeat subversives;
• demonstrating to potential aggressors that their
best attack schemes will likely fail to defeat
forward defenses that optimize the defender’s
home court advantages with modern defensive
technologies;
• organizing and securing the movement of near
and far Allied reinforcements during preconflict movement into deterrent postures;
• making conventional and nuclear deterrents
mutually supporting and credible; and
• establishing the credible potential to reverse any
gains by the aggressor and impose an advantageous peace.
The logical lines of effort that achieve these objectives
also enable the lines of effort required to achieve the
second task objective.
Task Objective 2: To Defeat Armed Aggression and
Restore a Favorable Peace
The current MDO’s second task objective is
to overcome Russian and Chinese technological
adaptations “to fight the US through multiple layers
of standoff in all domains—air, land, sea, space, cyber,
and information . . . that threaten the coherence of our
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operations.”14 In reality, however, this articulation of
the second task objective is an enabling objective of a
much more multifaceted task.
As stated in MDO’s foreword, “US Army forces,
as part of the Joint Force, will militarily compete,
penetrate, disintegrate, and exploit our adversaries in
the future.”15 This seemingly overlooks the demanding
task of defending the territory of an Ally under
armed attack. Success in this task is more dependent
on what is done ahead of time than by what is done
under attack. It appears that the MDO pamphlet does
not consider the idea of preparing forward defenses
and defending against attack as task objectives for
the US Army. Alternatively, perhaps it assumes that
Allied defenses will inevitably fail before the US
Army arrives. If so, the Allied task then becomes a
counteroffensive campaign of reconquest in the form
of a strategic movement to contact, which plays right
into the strong defensive suite of our adversaries and
their nuclear deterrent. This situation can and must
be avoided.
Therefore, the second task objective requires
defeating armed aggression against allies that we
are treaty-bound to defend and restoring a favorable
peace. This implies achieving several enabling lines of
operations and supporting objectives.
One line of operations requires the defeat of the
aggressor’s multiechelon (theater, district, front,
combined arms army, and division level) defenses
of multidimensionally integrated, defensive strike
complexes (comprised of air, sea, land, space, cyber,
and information components) in order to operate on
all other lines of operations successfully. Branching
14. TRADOC, U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations, i.
15. TRADOC, U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations, i.
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subordinate lines of operations must destroy the
aggressor’s supporting offensive and defensive
aviation, missile, naval, space, and cyber organizations,
as they affect the ends, ways, and means of the other
lines of operations.
The second line of operation must foil the early
fait accompli defeat of the frontline ally’s defenses
by shoring up the “home court advantage” of the
defender with modern defensive technology. This
should not be expensive, nor difficult to do, but is
essential self-help for frontline Allies. It is important
to support the leading role of sovereign Allies while
integrating the consolidation of gains and restoration
of peace into this line of operations.
The third line of operations must prearrange and
facilitate the reinforcement of frontline Allies by
other Allies nearby and, when possible, by forwarddeployed American forces. Success along this line
of effort depends on the well-planned use of so little
time between the first unambiguous warning and the
arrival of assaulting forces.
The fourth logical line of operations marshals
reinforcements behind the forward defense. From
behind the forward defense, Allied counterassault and
deep fires forces can launch simultaneous attacks on
the enemy’s assault forces and the supporting artillery
behind them.
Finally, the fifth logical line of operations prepares,
with Allies, the credible potential to reverse any
gains by the aggressor, and thereby impose an
advantageous peace. The task elements of reversing
gains and imposing an advantageous peace require
inseparable coordination from start to finish. Other
logical lines of operations are likely required and must
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be developed as this new counteraggression operating
concept matures.
In sum, the second task objective is to defeat armed
agression against allies we are treaty-bound to defend
and restore a favorable peace.
This restoration requires supporting lines of
operations that
• defeat Russian and Chinese multiechelon (theater, district, front, combined arms army, and
division level) defenses of multidimensionally
integrated defensive strike complexes comprised of air, land, sea, space, cyber, and information components (success on this line of
operations is key to successful operation on all
other lines);
• foil the early fait accompli defeat of the frontline
ally’s defenses by shoring up the “home court
advantage” of the defender with modern defensive technology;
• arrange and facilitate the reinforcement of Allies
under attack from nearby Allies and American
forward presence forces, making optimum use
of the scarce time between the first unambiguous warning and the arrival of assaulting forces
and fires;
• marshal reinforcing counterassault forces, and
deep fires forces behind the forward defense, to
attack the enemy’s assault forces and the supporting forces behind them simultaneously;
and with Allies,
• marshal and commit to action the credible
potential to reverse any gains by the aggressor,
thereby imposing an advantageous peace.
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We must not overlook the most valuable lesson
of the Cold War: We can avoid combat operations by
succeeding in our deterrence efforts. We can do this by
leading and rallying Allies to upgrade their readiness;
committing to Allied cross-reinforcement; preparing
modern forward defenses against fait accompli
assaults; and exercising Alliance reinforcement plans,
among other methods.
Task Objective 3: To Modernize America’s
“Way of War”
The third task objective frames the priority and
day-to-day challenge of the Army stationed at home:
this is modernizing America’s way of war specifically
to deter and defeat Russian and Chinese aggression
against allies that we are treaty-bound to defend. And
that means enabling the mission success of lines of
operations identified for task objectives one and two.
All of the emerging technologies mentioned in
MDO’s foreword will change techniques, methods,
and even the character of war, but the nature of war
continues to mean causing intractable and clever
humans to react as we intend either to keep the peace
or to defeat armed aggression. That difficult task
must be performed not within a generic operating
environment, but within the mission-specific situation
of the lines of operations that must succeed.
MDO’s current foreword, preface, and executive
summary say that the biggest military challenge
we face against “post-industrial information-based
states like China and Russia” is “maintaining the
coherence of our operations.”16 That may seem to be
the case, but thinking so limits us. We must certainly
16. TRADOC, U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations, i–vi.
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do more than adapt to the revolutionizing impact
of the technology of war, as the guidance says. We
must have a Joint Force capable, at all echelons, of
synergistic multidimensional (air, land, sea, space,
cyber, and information) operations. However, these
rule-of-thumb standards are insufficient for our
purposes. We must measure the size and scope
of the modernization task against real mission
requirements—the requirements of task objectives
one and two above. That means enabling the range
and scope of the core solution lines of operations
missions identified above for both the first and second
task objectives. Unfortunately, the current MDO
focuses on only the second task objective’s conflict
and combat line of operations: defeating Russian
and Chinese multiechelon (theater, district, front,
combined arms army, and division level) defenses
of multidimensionally integrated defensive strike
complexes comprised of air, land, sea, space, cyber,
and information components.
Today, we need more than the ability to defeat
the defenses our adversaries erect over their assault
formations. We need to organize a rapidly deployable
air, land, sea, space, cyber, and information defense of
Allied territory. This means Allies need to be capable
and ready, and we need the capacity to reinforce
them rapidly with minimum losses. This is a bigger
task than we now anticipate. Fortunately, we can
count the potential aggressor pressure points on a
single hand. It is not an overwhelming problem if we
decide where we will defend Allies and then apply
the capability and capacity to reinforce. Doing so is
certainly expensive, but it is far cheaper than the cost
and casualties involved with waiting to reinforce
unprepared Allies already under attack.
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One way to answer General Milley’s challenge
to modernize our obsolete way of war is to apply
revolutionizing technologies, as he directs, to the
new strategic mission in new ways. There is much to
learn from “the integration of machine guns, tanks,
and aviation which began the era of combined arms
warfare” mentioned in the MDO’s foreword. In fact,
the rate of integration of new tools of war has been
accelerating ever since. Many of the technologies that
revolutionized warfare during the AirLand Battle era
are commonplace now and provide the platform for
the current technological evolution.17 For example, the
means and methods we are now seeing in the hands
of the Russians and Chinese are based on what we
invented then.
While our Joint and combined operations
achieved high levels of excellence in integrating air,
sea, and land operations since AirLand Battle, new
levels of excellence must purposefully integrate the
newer dimensions of Joint and combined operations
throughout space, cyber, and information. While Joint
and combined maneuver and fires have always been
the bone and sinew of campaigning across the globe,
within theaters of war, and on tactical battlefields, we
must rejuvenate military campaigning and appreciate
the scale of sustainment required of the military
enterprise in new ways. The US Army provides an
inordinate and underappreciated proportion of this
sustainment to the common effort of the Joint and
combined military enterprises, and it will be required
to do even more in the future.
17. Donn A. Starry, “To Change an Army,” Military Review
64, no. 3 (March 1984): 20–27; and Huba Wass de Czege, “How
to Change an Army,” Military Review 64, no. 11 (November 1984):
33–49.
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According to timeless principles, while new
technology may be crucial to such rejuvenation,
applying it is even more crucial. For instance, new
technology has revolutionized ways to move, share,
and store information within our multiecheloned
and multiarmed organizations. Ways to guard and
improve this system are always advancing, but ways
to invade and degrade the enemy’s systems are also
always advancing. This dynamic places a premium on
enabling initiative. However, the successful practice of
mission command initiative, at any scale, at any time,
requires a leadership culture capable of
1. formulating and clearly transmitting the intent
of operations and orders to subordinates;
2. encouraging subordinates to act on unanticipated opportunities and unexpected dangers,
without permission; and
3. establishing a habit of expeditious information
sharing with subordinates, superiors, and peers.
Technology applied through the prism of timeless
principles improves ways to clarify, test, and verify
information, making it useful knowledge. Maintaining
superiority in this dimension of operations is vital.
The Active Defense doctrine of 1976 was an
application of new technology to the tactical tasks of
battalions, companies, and platoons. The AirLand
Battle doctrine of 1986 applied new capabilities,
born of new technology, to the missions of Brigades,
Divisions, and Corps. The current effort needs to
extend that thinking to theater-level missions of
deterrence, defense, and counteroffensives.
From General Starry’s perspective in 1981, the
battlefield and the battle were extended in three ways.
First, the battlefield was extended in depth because
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commanders had the means to engage enemy units
that were not yet in contact with frontline defenses and
could thus disrupt the enemy timetable, complicate
command and control, frustrate plans, and weaken the
enemy commander’s grasp on the initiative. Second,
the battlefield was extended forward in time because
of the current actions of our commanders against
interrelated enemy preparations (the movement of
follow-on echelons, the accomplishment of essential
logistical tasks, and the execution of preparatory
maneuver plans) create winning conditions in later
key engagements of the larger campaign. Third, the
battlefield was extended in the supporting means
available to commanders, both those organic to their
formations and those acquisition means and attack
resources available from higher-level Army and sister
service organizations.
But we can do more. A modern synergistic
multiechelon fighting method is based on a systemic
understanding of the enemy and on an effective
organizational system for engaging and defeating the
opposing enemy organization, echelon by echelon.
Today, we can extend the reach of higher commanders
to more than the normal one or two echelons; thus, we
can concentrate more resources on the more difficult
engagements of subordinates, and reinforce to ensure
that outcomes critical to higher levels are won. This
would be a fourth way modern forces can extend the
battlefield and the battle within the lines of operations
of their campaigns.
To summarize task objective three: Enable the
mission success of lines of operations identified for
task objectives one and two. To deter and defeat
Russian and Chinese aggression against allies that we
are treaty-bound to defend, we must modernize with
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a specific aim. That is to enable the range and scope of
the core solution lines of operations missions identified
above for the first and second task objectives:
1. to keep an advantageous peace (in the face of
Russian and Chinese challenges to the international status quo);
2. to defeat Russian and Chinese aggression against
allies that we are treaty-bound to defend; and
3. to lead an Allied offensive, when necessary,
to restore an advantageous peace in the
wake of war.
We have some clarity of what these three broader
tasks entail from the discussion above.
Modern military professionals understand that
warfare, by advances in its means, has proliferated
many novel ways to exert power relative to the various
elements of an organized and unified opposing force.
This proliferation of novel ways to exert power always
challenges the status quo. Synergy is an old idea
becoming more powerful as technological innovations
accrue. The invention and development of new means
are important, but their successful integration with
more established ways to exert power is more pivotal.
The sheer difficulty of causing clever and determined
adversaries to accept the terms we desire to impose
demands that we use as many complementary ways
of exerting power over the enemy as we can find.
CONCLUSION
At the heart of an operating concept should be its
theory of victory—the higher purpose to be achieved
and the logical basis for achieving that desired result.
That 1986 AirLand Battle theory of victory was to
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deter attack against Allies by making a systemic defeat
of the Warsaw Pact army and front-level offensive
formations seem highly likely, if not inevitable, to
the other side. In contrast, the aim of the Army’s
MDO concept seems to only solve the problems of
“ground combat operations against a sophisticated
peer enemy threat” within a generic future “operating
environment.” The logical basis for achieving that
desired result is to apply three operating tenets.
Instead, the MDO concept needs a credible theory
of victory—one that accomplishes the 1986 AirLand
Battle’s theory of victory for each possible offensive,
whether overt or covert and subversive. This purpose
is far more difficult to achieve. It will require daily
Allied efforts to keep an advantageous peace in the
face of the hostile competitive effort to disrupt it. At
the same time, the United States and its Allies must
stand ready together to defeat armed aggression
against allies that we are treaty-bound to defend and
to restore a favorable peace thereafter. Formulating
a credible and useful operating concept requires
examining the array of concrete cases of at-risk-ofaggression Allies with the scientific discipline to see
what ways and means are useful to achieve the aims
outlined above while challenging every unsupported
assertion and unwarranted assumption.
World War III has never happened because the
leadership of the potential aggressor believed they
would fail. Here, I propose the logic of a strong and
testable counteraggression theory of victory within
the Army’s senior leadership thinking. I argue that
responding to Russian or Chinese hegemonic behavior
will require a rapid, ready, and appropriate reaction
along anticipated lines of operations to deter rather
than accelerate crisis escalation and defend the status
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quo when challenged. That reaction must rely on
sound military theory built on a latticework of testable
(and tested) hypotheses that yield logical theories
of victory.
Recognizing many of the challenges I learned in
contributing to the development of AirLand Battle,
I offer this critique of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 to
avoid the foundational flaws from its predecessor
concepts, AirSea Battle and Multi-Domain Battle, and
to reinforce the “foundation for continued discussion,
analysis, and development” to evolving Army and
Joint doctrine.
I advocate for a revised theory of victory: Defeating
Russian and Chinese aggression against allies that we
are treaty-bound to defend is a distant second place,
even when we are successful in achieving a stable
and advantageous peace afterward. The real test of
sufficiency requires the Army to succeed along all of
the lines of operations identified in task objectives one
and two. Task objective three is to evolve and adapt
the warfighting means and methods necessary to
enable that mission. While some very essential lines of
effort are not in the Army’s power to initiate, they are
vitally important to strategic success and are within
the Army leadership’s power to advocate. Today,
the United States and its Allies must cooperate to
keep our advantageous peace. By keeping the peace
between the United States, Russia, and China, and
by the logic of our theory of victory, we are all more
likely to manage all the other lesser anticipated and
unanticipated dangers ahead.
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